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Abstract: This paper finds that lending by state banks is less procyclical than lending by private 
banks, especially in countries with good governance.  Lending by state banks in high income 
countries is even countercyclical. On the liability side, state banks expand potentially unstable 
non-deposit liabilities relatively little during booms, especially in countries with good 
governance. Public banks also report loan non-performance more evenly over the business cycle. 
Overall our results suggest that state banks can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the 
business cycle as well as during periods of financial instability.  However, the track record of 
state banks in credit allocation remains quite poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks 
as a short term counter-cyclical tool.  
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During the recent global financial crisis, several countries were forced to nationalize failing  
private banks. Abn Amro in the Netherlands, for instance, is now fully owned by the Dutch 
government. As a result, the average share of government ownership of banks by bank assets has 
increased in high-income countries form 7.3% in 2007 to 10.8% in 2009, to fall back slightly to 
9.9% in 2010. The increased prevalence of state banks is providing renewed impetus to the 
debate on the economic costs and benefits of state banking. While previous research has shown 
that state banks tend to perform badly, misallocate resources and lead to lower economic growth, 
relatively little is known about how state banks react to business cycle fluctuations. To fill this 
gap, this paper examines the lending behavior of state banks over the business cycle, and also 
fluctuations in the main types of bank funding that make this lending possible. In addition, this 
paper considers the relative accounting for non-performing loans by state banks, as differences in 
the reporting of bad loans over the business cycle by state and private banks are a potential 
mechanism to explain different capacities to provide new loans. Our analysis is based on a 
sample of 1633 banks from 111 countries over the 1999-2010 period. 
We find that lending by state banks is less procyclical than the lending by private banks, 
especially if the bank is located in a country with good governance.  We capture good 
governance by an index of government effectiveness, which increases with perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the degree of independence from political pressures and the credibility 
of a government’s commitment to its own effectiveness. Moreover, lending by state banks 
located in high-income countries is even countercyclical. State banks also expand their credit 
relatively more during banking crises, which points at a stabilizing influence of state banks at a 
time of financial instability. Among private banks, we find that foreign-owned banks’ lending is 
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especially procyclical, perhaps because these banks have ready access to funding from their 
international parent firms to take advantage of local lending opportunities during economic 
upswings. 
On the liability side, state banks increase their non-deposit liabilities relatively little during 
booms, especially if these banks are located in countries with good governance. Since non-
deposit liabilities tend to be less stable than deposits, private banks’ increased reliance on them 
during economic booms potentially puts these banks at risk during downturns. Private banks also 
report relatively higher loan quality during economic expansions, increasing their ability to ramp 
up new lending during upswings compared to state banks.  In contrast, state banks report loan 
quality more evenly over the business cycle. Hence during recessions, state banks are able to 
maintain higher rates of loan growth, as they are able to achieve higher rates of growth of non-
deposit funding and report lower increases in the growth rate of non-performing loans. 
Overall our results suggest that state banks can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the 
business cycle as well as during periods of financial instability.  However, the track record of 
state banks in credit allocation remains quite poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks 
as a short term counter-cyclical tool. For this purpose, alternative policy tools in the form of 
macroprudential bank regulation, including procyclical capital requirements and monetary policy 
are more appropriate, as they are more flexible than state ownership of banking and would not 
lead to credit misallocation resulting in low economic growth.
2
   
There is a substantial literature on the impact of state ownership of banks on banking 
performance and economic outcomes.  A large number of cross-country studies show that state 
ownership of banking is associated with low bank efficiency and lower levels of financial 
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 For an analysis of countercyclical bank regulation in Basel III, see Repullo and Saurina (2011). 
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development (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001, 2004, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2002). State bank ownership lowers banking sector outreach (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez Peria, 2007), and leads to wider intermediation spreads and slower economic growth as 
well as greater financial instability (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Caprio and 
Martinez Peria, 2002). Dinc (2005) shows that state bank lending is politically motivated, since 
state banks in emerging markets increase their lending relative to private banks in election years. 
 Banking outcomes also worsen with state ownership. For example, Mian (2003) finds that 
state-owned banks report higher loan loss provisioning and achieve lower profitability than 
private banks using data for a large set of emerging economies. Micco, Panizza and Yanez 
(2007) report that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower 
profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts. Cornett et al. (2010) find that state-
owned banks in 16 Asian countries operated less profitably and had greater credit risk than 
privately-owned bank prior to 2001, although this performance gap was largely closed after the 
Asian financial crisis. 
Individual country studies provide consistent results. Berger et al. (2005) find that the 
performance of state-owned banks in Argentina, for instance as measured by cost efficiency, was 
low in the 1990s, and improved considerably after privatization. Lin and Zhang (2009) find that 
the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks in China are less profitable, are less efficient, and 
have worse asset quality than other types of banks that involve some domestic or foreign private 
ownership. Importantly, country level studies also show that politicians use government bank 
lending to provide political patronage leading to significant credit misallocation (See for example 
Cole (2009) for India, Khwaja and Mian (2005) for Pakistan, Carvalho (2010) for Brazil, and 
Sapienza (2004) for Italy). Not only is state bank lending more politicized and inefficient, it in 
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addition generally does not serve the more credit constrained segments of the population, such as 
small and medium enterprises (Berger et al., 2008; Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu, 2011).   Hence, 
there is an overwhelming amount of consistent literature suggesting that state ownership of 
banks lowers bank performance, with negative consequences for economic growth.  
In contrast, the literature examining the lending behavior of state banks during business 
cycles is quite sparse with mixed results.  Micco and Panizza (2006) relate bank credit growth to 
GDP growth and an interaction term of GDP growth and a state ownership variable for an 
international sample of banks over the 1995-2002 period finding that credit growth of state banks 
is less procyclical than for private banks. In contrast, using a sample of 210 Western European 
banks over the 2000-2009 period, Iannotta et al. (2011) do not find a statistically significant  
difference between state and private bank lending for the smaller European sample. Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2012) examine the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in a sample of 
Latin American and Eastern European developing countries before and after the global financial 
crisis, finding mixed results.  They show that state banks in Latin America acted in a counter-
cyclical fashion during the crisis, whereas those in Eastern Europe did not, hence emphasizing 
regional differences. 
        In this paper our approach is similar to Micco and Panizza (2006) and Iannotta et al. (2011), 
but unlike these two studies we control for possible endogeneity of GDP growth to credit growth 
by using system GMM estimation. In addition, we consider a large worldwide sample of banks 
for the recent period from 1999 to 2010, including the recent global banking crisis. Furthermore, 
unlike previous papers we consider the dynamics of the main categories of bank funding and of 
the accounting for non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning to better understand the 
various ‘channels’ that influence state bank lending over the business cycle. Finally, we also 
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examine differences in lending behavior among domestic private banks versus foreign banks for 
a large number of countries.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data including 
our bank ownership classification. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology, and the 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on an international sample of 1633 banks from 111 countries 
for the period 1999-2010. See Table A1 in the Appendix for details on the number of banks per 
country. The main data source is Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope which provides information on 
statements of banks and their ownership structure.
3
 To create time series information on the 
ownership of banks, we used Bankscope CDs starting from 1999 and Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) for recent years. The CDs include snapshots of ownership structures in 
relevant years. In addition, we use various websites to classify the owner as private or state 
including Bankscope’s online database, Factiva, Banker’s Almanac and company websites of the 
banks. In our sample, we only include banks that we can identify to be owned by another entity 
with a 50% percent or higher ownership share. Thus, a bank is categorized as a state bank if it is 
majority-owned by a state-owned entity.
4
  
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the average share of state ownership by bank assets. 
Specifically, the figure plots the average state ownership share for all countries, and separately 
for the groups of developing countries (and emerging markets), and high-income countries. The 
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 For all banks, we consider the financial statements at the highest level of consolidation within a country to avoid 
duplication of the data. 
4
 Alternatively, La Porta et al. (2002) and  Cornett et al. (2010) use a 20% government ownership threshold to 
identify state banks yielding  comparable data.  
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average state ownership share in each instance is the weighted average of the shares of bank 
assets owned by state banks in pertinent countries, with the weights reflecting the number of 
observations in these countries. During the last decades, the share of state ownership in 
developing countries has tended to decline, from 34.6% in 1999 to 19.4% in 2010. This decrease 
was especially pronounced during the years from 2007 to 2010. Average state ownership in high-
income countries, instead, has increased somewhat from 7.9% in 1999 to 9.9% in 2010, with 
most of the increase occurring after 2007. Overall the state ownership share has been rather 
stable around 19%, although it declined from 17.5% in 2009 to 13.5% in 2010. These trend data 
suggest that government ownership of banks is likely to remain prevalent in future years. In the 
empirical work, as a robustness check we also consider a further breakdown of privately-owned 
banks into domestic and foreign banks.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample of banks. The main variable of interest is 
the loans variable, which is the log of net loans in local currency and deflated using the national 
GDP deflator (see Table A2 in the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources). We 
consider several variables to represent the sources of bank funding:  total liabilities, deposits, 
non-deposit liabilities, short-term funding, long-term liabilities, and equity. These variables are 
also constructed as the logs of amounts in local currency and deflated by the GDP deflator. To 
proxy for the cost of bank funding, we construct the net interest expense ratio as the log of one 
plus the bank’s interest expenses over interest bearing liabilities net of the government T-Bill 
rate taken from IMF International Financial Statistics database (IFS, 2012). As indices of the 
quality of lending, we consider the loan loss provision and non-performing loans variables. 
The state bank variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank has a majority state 
ownership share. In our sample, 11.4% of bank-year observations concern state-owned banks. 
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Privately owned banks can have domestic or foreign ownership. The domestic bank variable 
indicates majority private domestic ownership, while the foreign bank variable signals majority 
private foreign ownerships. Domestic and foreign banks constitute 52.8% and 35.8% of our 
observations. 
To represent business cycles, we use per capita real income growth in percentages, with  
a mean value of 1.96%.  The impact of state ownership on the procyclicality of banks lending 
possibly depends on the general effectiveness of the government bureaucracy, i.e. good 
governance. As a proxy of this, we use a composite indicator of the government effectiveness 
from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database (Kaufmann et al., 2010), which includes 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures. This variable is reported on an annual basis only after 
2001, limiting regressions that include this variable to the period 2002-2010.  
We consider several bank-level control variables, all lagged one year. Among these, assets it 
the log of total assets in constant 2000 dollars to capture the impact of a bank’s too-big-to-fail 
status.  Equity is the ratio of equity to total assets, to control for bank soundness, averaging 
10.6% in our sample. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank and savings banks are 
dummy variables that are one if a bank is in the pertinent bank category. The loans over assets 
variable represents the relative importance of lending in a bank’s activities, with a mean of 
0.540. Liquidity, constructed as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, can be  a measure of bank 
soundness and its ability to sustain its lending, as well as an indicator of inefficiency (since too 
much liquidity comes at the cost of bank intermediation). In addition, deposits over total 
liabilities is a measure of the stability of a bank’s funding, since non-deposit funding tends to 
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flee quickly during periods of instability. In our sample the bulk of the funding source consists of 
deposits, with a share of 0.771. 
We consider two macroeconomic controls from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2011) 
database. These are GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars, and inflation 
measured as the percentage change in the GDP deflator.  Finally, the bank crisis variable is a 
dummy variable signaling a country is experiencing a banking crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 
2010). 
 
3. Methodology and empirical results 
In section 3.1, we describe the system GMM estimation that we apply to our empirical 
specifications. In section 3.2, we present our results regarding the relative procylicality of state 
banks regarding their lending, funding volumes and costs, and reporting of non-performing loans 
and loan loss provisioning. Section 3.3 reports some robustness checks on the relative 
procyclicality of lending by state banks. 
 
3.1.    Estimation methodology 
Our empirical specifications take the form of Arellano-Bond dynamic equations as follows: 




 ε,,,                  (1) 
where y,, is the dependent variable for bank i in country j in year t, Xi.j.t  is a set of explanatory 
variables, ηi is a bank fixed effect,  is a time fixed effect and εi,j,t  is an error term. In a 
regression to test for the procyclicality of lending by state banks, for instance, the dependent 
variable is the loans variable, while the set of explanatory variables includes the growth rate of 
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per capita GDP and its interaction with the state bank variable. First differencing (1) serves to 
eliminate the bank fixed effect as follows: 
,,  ,,	  ,,	  ,, 
 ,,  ,,	 
  
 ,,  ,,	      (2) 
We apply the system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
jointly to (1) and (2) using lagged first differences as instruments.5 We take all explanatory 
variables - except GDP per capita growth, the bank ownership variables, government 
effectiveness and relevant interaction terms - as predetermined, meaning that current values of 
these variables can be correlated with post and current error terms but not with future error 
terms. In addition, the error terms are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, and lagged first 
differences of right-hand side variables are assumed to be orthogonal to bank specific fixed-
effects to obtain consistent GMM estimation. Furthermore, we use two-step GMM estimation 
and the Windmeijer (2005) correction, which adjusts the covariance matrix for finite samples to 
minimize the downward bias in standard errors. 
We report two main tests to determine the appropriateness of our dynamic GMM estimations. 
The first test is the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions with as the null hypothesis that 
instruments are exogenous. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the instruments are valid.  A 
further test is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the errors, with as a null hypothesis 
no autocorrelation in differenced residuals. Specifically, the second-order test in first differences 
tests for autocorrelation in levels. 
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 We do not use the first lag of levels and current first differences of endogenous variables as instruments, but 
include all other lags, to ensure the exogeneity of our instruments and to avoid having too many instruments 
reducing the power of overidentifying restrictions tests. The second lag of endogenous variables, specifically, is not 
correlated with the current error term, while the first lag is. The difference estimator applied only to (2) has several 
drawbacks. It only exploits the time series dimension of data as it uses first differences, and not the cross-sectional 
dimension. In addition the lagged variables become weak instruments if the explanatory variables are persistent over 
time deteriorating asymptotic properties (see Beck (2008)). For an application of system GMM estimation to 




3.2.     Empirical results 
We first examine the cyclicality of lending by state-owned banks relative to privately owned 
banks. To do this, we specify a regression where the dependent variable is the loans variable, and 
where the set of explanatory variables includes the growth rate of GDP per capita, the state bank 
variable, and an interaction of these two variables.
6
 The coefficient on the growth rate of GDP 
per capita informs about the cyclicality of lending by private banks, while the sum of this 
coefficient and the coefficient on the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank 
variable measures the cyclicality of lending by state banks.  
Table 2 reports 4 regressions of the loans variable.  Regression 2 differs from regression 1 in  
that it includes a larger set of bank variables as controls. Starting from regressions 1 and 2, 
regressions 3 and 4 in addition include the government effectiveness variable and a triple 
interaction of this variable with GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable. In all 
regressions, real GDP per capita growth enters with positive coefficients that are significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that lending by private banks is procyclical. Estimated coefficients vary 
between 0.017 and 0.020, suggesting that a 1% increase in per capita GDP growth is associated 
with 1.7-2.0% increase in credit growth.  In regressions 1 and 2, the estimated coefficients for the 
interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank dummy are -0.013 and -0.014, 
respectively, and they are significant at 1%. Thus, an increase in GDP per capita growth by 1% is 
estimated to increase lending by state banks by 0.7% and 0.6%, which suggests that lending by 
state bank is procyclical but less so than for private banks.  
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 A lagged loans variable is included as a control variable yielding estimated coefficients that are close to unity. 
Most of these coefficients -and especially those greater than 1- are not statistically different from unity. 
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In regressions 3 and 4, the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable 
obtain coefficients of -0.011 that are significant at 1%. The triple interaction variable obtains a 
negative coefficient of -0.005 in regression 3 that is significant at 5%, and a coefficient of -0.004 
is regression 4 that is marginally insignificant with a p-value of 0.105. These negative 
coefficients suggest that state banks are even less pro-cyclical in countries with good 
governance. Based on regression 3, we infer that a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth causes 
a domestic bank to increase its lending by 1.7%, while a state bank in a country with average 
government effectiveness of 0.888 increases its lending by 0.156%  (=0.017-0.011+(-
0.005*0.888)).  Thus, lending by a state bank in a country with average government 
effectiveness is procyclical, but far less so than for a private bank.  Our estimated coefficients 
also imply that lending by state banks is countercyclical if the government effectiveness variable 
exceeds 1.2 (note that the maximum value of government effectiveness is 2.374 from Table 1).
7
 




Less procyclical or even countercyclical lending by state banks suggests that the funding of 
public banks and potentially also the cost of funding are relatively insensitive to the business 
cycle. Next, we examine which type of funding of state banks expands relatively less than that of 
the private banks during the upswing of the business cycle (and vice versa), and whether public 
banks are rewarded for the low procyclicality of their lending by relatively small increases in 
their funding costs during boom periods (and vice versa). The funding categories we consider, as 
found on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, are total liabilities, deposits and non-deposit 
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 Similar results are obtained if we include an election variable to control for the impact of the electoral cycle on 
bank lending as in Dinc (2005) (unreported). 
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liabilities, short-term funding and long-term liabilities, and equity. Our funding cost variable is 
the net interest expense ratio, defined as the log of interest expenses over total interest-bearing 
liabilities minus the government T-Bill rate. For each of these funding quantity and funding cost 
variables, we specify two regressions analogous to regressions 3 and 4 of Table 2. The results are 
reported in Table 3. 
In several regressions in Table 3, we observe negative and significant coefficients on the 
interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank dummy, and/or on the triple interaction 
of these two variables and the government effectiveness variable, indicating that funding at state 
banks is less procyclical than at private banks. To start, in the total liabilities regressions 1 and 2, 
the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable obtains negative coefficients 
of -0.007 and -0.008 that are significant at 5%, indicating that the growth rate of total liabilities 
of state banks is relatively low during economic booms. In the non-deposit liabilities regressions 
5 and 6, the double and triple interactions obtain negative coefficients with significance of at 
least 10%, indicating that non-deposit liabilities that grow less at state banks during booms, 
especially if these banks are located in countries with high government effectiveness. Estimated 
coefficients in both regressions suggest that non-deposit liabilities at a state bank in a country 
with average government effectiveness are countercyclical. From regression 5, for instance, we 
see that a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth leads to reduction of non-deposit liabilities of -
0.976% = (0.026-0.018-0.020*0.888). In the short-term funding regression 8, the interaction of 
GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable receives a negative coefficient of -0.006, 
suggesting that short-term funding at state banks is less procyclical. In the equity regressions 11 
and 12, he triple interaction variable obtains negative coefficients of -0.007 and -0.008 that are 
significant at 5%. Parameter estimates imply that equity growth is less procyclical for state banks 
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in a country with average government effectiveness, while it is countercyclical in countries with 
government effectiveness exceeding 1.286.  In the net interest expense ratio regressions 13 and 
14, none of the interaction variables is statistically significant, suggesting that the funding costs 
are equally procyclical for private and state banks. In regression 14, the GDP per capita growth 
variable obtains a positive coefficient of 0.001 that is significant at 10% so that generally funding 
costs appear to be procyclical. The Hansen test of the overidentifying restriction is passed 
throughout Table 3, while the AR(2) test is also passed except in the equity regressions 11 and 
12 where they are rejected at 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Next, we consider whether private banks are able to expand their lending relatively more 
during booms, because they report higher loan quality during economic upswings.  In particular, 
we consider the relative reporting on non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning by private 
and state banks over the business cycle. The non-performing loans variable is the dependent 
variable in regressions 1-4 of Table 4, while the loan loss provisioning variable is the dependent 
variable in regressions 5-8. In each instance, the 4 reported regressions differ in the number of 
included bank-level control variables and in whether government effectiveness and its interaction 
with GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable are included.  
In the non-performing loans regressions 1-4, GDP per capita growth obtains a negative 
coefficient -0.003 that is significant at 1%, while its interaction with the state bank variable 
obtains positive coefficients of 0.002 with significance of at least 10%. Thus, the reporting of 
non-performing loans by state banks is less countercyclical. This could mean that the actual 
occurrence of non-performing loans at state banks is less countercyclical, or alternatively that 
state banks report loan non-performance more evenly over the business cycle.  Analogously, in 
the loan loss provisioning regressions 5 and 6, the GDP per capita growth rate obtain negative 
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coefficients of -0.002 that are significant at 1%, while its interaction with the state bank variable 
obtains positive coefficients of 0.001 that are significant at 1%.  Hence, reporting of loan loss 
provisioning by state banks appears less countercyclical, either because loan deterioration is less 
countercyclical at state banks or because the accounting for loan deterioration by state banks is 
relatively conservative during booms. In the latter interpretation, loan loss provisioning at private 
banks is overoptimistic during booms, perhaps to enable these banks to take full advantage of 
perceived lending opportunities during economic expansions. However, in regressions 7 and 8, 
the triple interaction of the GDP per capita growth, state bank, and government effectiveness 
variables obtains a negative coefficient of -0.010 that is significant at 1%. This suggests that loan 
loss provisioning at state banks becomes more countercyclical as government effectiveness 
increases, perhaps because state banks undertake additional loan loss provisioning during 
economic downturns in an environment of high government effectiveness. Overall, our results on 
the relative procylicality of loan loss provisioning by state banks are inconclusive.  In the loan 
loss provisioning regressions 5 and 7, Hansen overidentification tests are rejected at 10% level, 
indicating the instruments are not valid. In the corresponding regressions 6 and 8 that include 
additional bank-level controls, however, these tests are passed.  
 
3.3.     Robustness checks on the procyclicality of lending 
Private banks can be domestic or foreign-owned. Foreign-owned banks tend to be 
subsidiaries of international banks. This potentially enables them to obtain additional funding 
from the international parent bank in case their local profitable lending opportunities expand. 
Thus, with a more elastic supply of funds, foreign banks may be able to expand their lending 
relatively more during economic upswings. To test this, we re-estimate regressions 1 and 2 of 
16 
 
Table 2 after including a foreign bank variable and its interaction with GDP per capita growth. 
The results are reported as regressions 1 and 2 of Table 5. In the two regressions, the interaction 
of GDP per capita growth and the foreign bank variable obtains coefficients of 0.009 and 0.008 
that are significant at 1%, implying that lending by private, foreign banks is more procyclical 
than lending by private, domestic banks. In both regressions, the interaction of the GDP per 
capita variable and the state bank variable obtains a coefficient of -0.008 that are significant at 
5%, indicating that lending by state banks is less procyclical than for private, domestic banks. 
Regressions 3 and 5 include interactions of the GDP per capita variable with alternatively the 
state bank, domestic bank, and foreign bank variables. In both regressions, the three interaction 
terms are estimated with coefficients with significance of at least 10%. Estimated coefficients 
confirm increasing procyclicality of lending from state banks to private, domestic banks, and to 
private, foreign banks. Specifically, a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth leads to a credit 
supply growth of 0.5-0.6% for state bank, 1.1-1.2% for private, domestic banks and 2.1-2.2% for 
private foreign banks. 
Next, we consider whether the relative procylicality of lending by state banks depends on the 
level of economic development. In particular, we estimate regressions 1-4 of Table 2 separately 
for the samples of high-income countries and developing countries (and emerging markets), 
using the World Bank classification. The results are reported in Table 6. In the high-income 
countries regressions 1 and 2, the interaction of GDP per capita and the state bank variable is 
estimated with negative and significant coefficients.
9
 Interestingly, point estimates suggest that 
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 Similarly, Iannotta et al. (2011, Table 6) report that credit growth at state banks in Western Europe over the 2000-
2009 period is relatively less procyclical, although this effect is not statistically significant. The difference in results 
could reflect a difference in sample size : 976 banks and 3439 observations in our high-income sample in regression 
1 of Table 6, and 210 banks and 1541 observations in Iannotta et al. (2011). A further difference is that we define 




credit in high income countries is procyclical for private bank, and countercyclical for state 
banks. Specifically, a 1% increase in GDP per capita growth is estimated to lead to a 1.3% 
increase in lending by private banks, and a 0.4% decrease in lending by state banks. Regressions 
3 and 4 have similar implications, although the coefficients for the interaction of GDP per capita 
growth and the state bank dummy are marginally insignificant. In regressions 5-8 for the sample 
of developing countries, the interactions of GDP per capita growth and the state bank dummy 
obtain negative coefficients in the range from -0.011 to -0.008. Parameter estimates imply that 
credit by state banks is procyclical, but less so than for private banks. Throughout, the 
government effectiveness variable and the triple interaction of this variable with GDP per capita 
growth and the state bank variable are estimated with insignificant coefficients. Thus, variation 
in government effectiveness within the samples of high income countries and developing 
countries does not appear to affect the procylicality of lending by state banks, even if is it shown 
to affect this procyclicality in the pooled sample in Table 2.  
Banking crises may lead to a scarcity of bank credit. Thus, the stabilization of credit by state 
banks is potentially most useful during a banking crisis. To conclude this section, we consider 
how relative lending by state banks and its degree of procylicality vary over crisis and non-crisis 
periods. To start, regressions 1-4 of Table 7 include a banking crisis variable, and its interactions 
with the state bank variable and jointly GDP per capita growth and the state banking variable in 
regressions 1-4 of Table 2. These additional variables are statistically insignificant in the 4 
regressions. Hence, we cannot detect a different degree of procylicality of credit by state banks 
during crisis and non-crisis periods. Alternatively, regressions 5-8 include these additional 
variables, but delete the interaction of GDP per capita growth and the state bank variable, and the 
triple interaction of these two variables with the government effectiveness variable. The resulting 
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regressions test how credit growth of private and state banks is different during crisis and non-
crisis periods. The banking crisis variable itself enters with a negative coefficient of -0.020 that 
is significant at 10% in regression 8, providing some evidence that lending by private banks is 
lower during banking crises. The interaction terms of the banking crisis variable and the state 
bank variable obtains coefficients in the range 0.123-0.155 with significance of at least 10%, 
implying that credit growth of state banks during a banking crisis is higher than for private 
banks. Estimates of coefficients suggest that the growth rate of loans provided by of state banks 
is positive during banking crises, counterbalancing any negative growth in the credit supply of 
private banks.  
 
4.      Conclusion 
This paper finds that lending by state banks is less procyclical than the lending by private 
banks, especially if the bank is located in a country with good governance, as proxied by 
indicators of government effectiveness. Moreover, lending by state banks in high income 
countries is even countercyclical. Among private banks, we find that foreign-owned banks’ 
lending is especially procyclical, perhaps because these banks have ready access to funding from 
their international parent firms to take advantage of local lending opportunities during economic 
upswings.  State banks also expand their credit relatively more during banking crises, which 
suggests a stabilizing influence of state banks at a time of financial instability. 
On the liability side, state banks expand their non-deposit liabilities relatively little during 
booms, especially if these banks are located in countries with good governance. In contrast, the 
relative increase in non-deposit liabilities of private banks during economic booms puts these 
banks at some risk, as this type of funding may be less stable than funding through deposits.  
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Public banks report relatively high additional non-performing loans during economic 
upswings. This may reflect either that the relative loan quality of state banks deteriorates during 
expansions (improves during economic downturns), or that state banks report loan non-
performance more evenly over the business cycle. Overall our results suggest that state banks 
can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the business cycle as well as during periods of 
financial instability.  However, the track record of state banks in credit allocation remains quite 
poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks as a short term counter-cyclical tool.  
Furthermore, an important question is whether this credit expansion during the downturn is the 
result of lending to the most constrained borrowers, such as small and medium enterprises or to 
larger politically favored enterprises.  Another issue is whether state bank lending retrenches 
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Table A1. Countries, average state ownership and number of banks 
 
Average state ownership is average yearly ratio of total assets of state bank to total assets of all banks.   
 


















Albania Developing 0 2 Germany High income 0.142 59 Norway High income 0 11 
Antigua and Barbuda Developing 0 1 Ghana Developing 0.154 4 Pakistan Developing 0.641 12 
Argentina Developing 0.426 19 Greece High income 0.278 8 Panama Developing 0 21 
Armenia Developing 0 3 Guatemala Developing 0 2 Peru Developing 0 3 
Australia High income 0 28 Haiti Developing 0 2 Philippines Developing 0.635 9 
Austria High income 0.088 29 Honduras Developing 0 1 Poland Developing 0.177 19 
Azerbaijan Developing 0.758 5 Hong Kong High income 0.070 24 Portugal High income 0.187 23 
Bahrain Developing 0 2 Hungary Developing 0.007 17 Qatar High Income 0 2 
Bangladesh Developing 0 2 Iceland High income 0.068 2 Romania Developing 0.102 11 
Barbados Developing 0.097 4 India Developing 0.998 15 Russian Federation Developing 0.722 46 
Belarus Developing 0.790 8 Indonesia Developing 0.712 14 Saudi Arabia High income 0.240 9 
Belgium High income 0 19 Ireland High income 0.063 19 Senegal Developing 0 1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Developing 0 1 Israel High income 0.121 10 Singapore High income 0 3 
Botswana Developing 0 3 Italy High income 0 41 Slovakia Developing 0.078 10 
Brazil Developing 0.410 58 Jamaica Developing 0 7 Slovenia High income 0.482 4 
Bulgaria Developing 0.030 7 Japan High income 0.118 48 South Africa Developing 0.033 21 
Burundi Developing 0 1 Jordan Developing 0 5 Spain High Income 0.004 14 
Cambodia Developing 0 1 Kazakhstan Developing 0.100 10 Sri Lanka Developing 0.963 6 
Canada High income 0 36 Kenya Developing 0 10 Swaziland Developing 0 1 
Chile Developing 0.154 17 Korea, Republic Of Developing 0.529 14 Sweden High income 0.084 12 
China, People's Republic Developing 0.992 9 Kuwait High income 0 2 Switzerland High income 0.001 32 
Colombia Developing 0 5 Latvia Developing 0.065 15 Tanzania Developing 0 1 
Costa Rica Developing 0.682 7 Lebanon Developing 0 12 Thailand Developing 0.708 10 
Croatia Developing 0 7 Lithuania Developing 0.011 8 Trinidad and Tobago Developing 0.397 6 
Cuba Developing 1 1 Luxembourg High income 0.066 14 Tunisia Developing 0 5 
Cyprus High income 0 8 Malawi Developing 0 1 Turkey Developing 0.466 27 
Czech Republic Developing 0.028 9 Malaysia Developing 0.005 28 Uganda Developing 0 5 
Denmark High income 0.001 13 Mauritius Developing 0.121 2 Ukraine Developing 0.079 16 
Dominican Republic Developing 0 2 Mexico Developing 0 24 United Arab Emirates High income 0.752 14 
Ecuador Developing 0 3 Moldova Developing 1 1 United Kingdom High income 0.105 79 
Egypt Developing 0.297 3 Morocco Developing 0 3 United States High income 0 252 
El Salvador Developing 0 5 Mozambique Developing 0 2 Uruguay Developing 0 1 
Estonia Developing 0.004 4 Namibia Developing 0 4 Uzbekistan Developing 0.937 3 
Ethiopia Developing 1 1 Netherlands High income 0.197 37 Venezuela Developing 0.093 5 
Finland High income 0.025 7 New Zealand High income 0.019 7 Vietnam Developing 0.944 5 
France High income 0.097 110 Nicaragua Developing 0 1 Zambia Developing 0 3 




Table A2. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Sources 
Loans Log of net loans over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Liabilities Log of liabilities over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Deposits Log of deposits over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Non-deposit liabilities Log of non-deposit liabilities over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Short-term funding Log of short-term funding including deposits over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Long-term liabilities Log of long-term liabilities over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Equity Log of equity over GDP deflator Bankscope and WDI 
Net interest expense ratio 
Log (interest expense over interest-bearing liabilities net of government T-Bill rate +1) 
Bankscope, WDI and IMF 
IFS 
Loan loss provisioning Log (loan loss provisions over net loans + 1)  Bankscope and WDI 
Non-performing loans Log (non-performing loans over gross loans + 1) Bankscope 
State bank  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share, and zero otherwise 
Bankscope, Banker’s 
Almanac and various sources 
Domestic bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is domestically owned and not state-owned with a majority share, and 
zero otherwise 
Bankscope 
Foreign bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is foreign-owned and not state-owned with a majority share, and zero 
otherwise 
Bankscope 
Government effectiveness  An index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
WGI 
Assets* Log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars Bankscope and WDI 
Equity over assets* Equity over total assets Bankscope and WDI 
Loans over assets* Net loans over total assets Bankscope 
Liquidity* Liquid assets over total assets Bankscope 
Deposits* Total deposits over total Liabilities Bankscope 
Cooperative bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is a cooperative bank, and zero otherwise Bankscope 
Real estate and mortgage bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is a real estate or mortgage bank, and zero otherwise Bankscope 
Savings bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is a savings bank, and zero otherwise Bankscope 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars WDI 
GDP per capita growth Rate of real per capita GDP growth in percentages WDI 
Inflation Rate of change in GDP deflator in percentages WDI 
Banking crisis Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is in a banking crisis, and zero otherwise Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
   *These variables are lagged in panel GMM regressions  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Loans is log of net loans over GDP deflator. Liabilities is log of total liabilities over GDP deflator. Deposits is log of  
deposits over GDP deflator. Non-deposit liabilities is log of non-deposit liabilities over GDP deflator. Short-term 
funding is log of deposits and short-term funding over GDP deflator. Long-term liabilities is log of total liabilities 
minus short-term funding over GDP deflator. Equity is log of equity over GDP deflator.  Net interest expense ratio is 
interest expenses over total interest-bearing liabilities minus government T-Bill rate. Loans loss provisioning  is  log 
of loan loss provisions over net loan ratio plus one. Non-performing loans is log of non-performing loans over gross 
loans plus one. State bank, Domestic bank and Foreign bank are dummy variables that equals 1 if a bank is state-
owned, domestically and privately owned or foreign-owned and privately owned with a majority share. Government 
effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is 
liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, Real 
estate and mortgage bank  and Saving bank  are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is of the implied type. GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per 
capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. Banking crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the country is in a banking crisis.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
      
Loans 6181 22.460 3.072 11.344 32.868 
Liabilities 6181 23.089 2.977 14.157 33.128 
Deposits 6082 22.753 3.023 9.707 32.704 
Non-deposit liabilities 6090 21.105 3.286 10.819 32.178 
Short-term funding 6151 22.864 2.995 14.093 32.817 
Long-term liabilities 6153 20.780 3.299 10.819 32.051 
Equity 6172 20.769 2.777 13.751 30.521 
Net interest expense ratio 4247 -0.016 0.089 -3.035 0.468 
Loan loss provisioning 5913 0.013 0.031 -0.524 0.604 
Non-performing loans 3991 0.048 0.061 0 0.647 
State bank  6181 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Domestic bank  6181 0.528 0.499 0 1 
Foreign Bank  6081 0.358 0.480 0 1 
Government effectiveness 5218 0.888 0.879 -1.645 2.374 
Assets 6181 21.914 1.921 13.096 27.816 
Equity over assets 6181 0.106 0.090 0.000 0.974 
Loans over assets 6081 0.540 0.218 0.001 0.999 
Liquidity 6081 0.239 0.191 0.000 0.978 
Deposits over liabilities 6081 0.771 0.222 0.000 1 
Cooperative bank 6081 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Real estate and mortgage bank 6081 0.025 0.156 0 1 
Savings bank 6081 0.035 0.183 0 1 
GDP per capita 6181 17.763 13.898 0.109 56.389 
GDP per capita growth 6181 1.960 3.983 -17.545 33.030 
Inflation 6181 4.988 7.000 -24.758 185.291 





Table 2. The determinants of bank lending 
 
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of 
real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority 
share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total 
assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits  over total liabilities. 
Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank  and saving bank  are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. 
GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP 
deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). 
The p-values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loans Loans Loans Loans 
Lagged loans 1.002*** 0.998*** 0.994*** 0.991*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State bank 0.047** 0.054** 0.053*** 0.059*** 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.006) (0.002) 
GDP per capita growth * State bank -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Government effectiveness -0.050 -0.048 
(0.120) (0.161) 
GDP per capita growth * State bank 
dummy * Government effectiveness -0.005** -0.004 
(0.027) (0.105) 
Assets -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 
(0.508) (0.806) (0.947) (0.869) 
Equity over assets 0.069 0.040 -0.018 -0.034 
(0.350) (0.778) (0.797) (0.658) 
Loans over assets -0.080 -0.055 
(0.375) (0.115) 
Liquidity 0.045 0.018 
(0.772) (0.681) 
Deposits over liabilities 0.041 0.025 
(0.453) (0.278) 
Cooperative bank 0.048** 0.053*** 
(0.013) (0.001) 
Real estate and mortgage bank 0.012 0.013 
(0.583) (0.545) 
Savings bank 0.026 0.010 
(0.232) (0.497) 
GDP per capita -0.001** -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.022) (0.369) (0.618) (0.642) 
Inflation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.166*** 0.152 0.181*** 0.214*** 
(0.003) (0.275) (0.001) (0.005) 
Number of observations 6181 6081 5218 5132 
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Number of banks 1633 1609 1506 1483 
Number of instruments 272 278 352 358 
Second order AR tests 0.508 0.611 0.933 0.841 
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.200 0.269 0.818 0.847 
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Table 3. The determinants of bank sources and costs of funds 
The dependent variables are Liabilities, Deposits, Non-deposit liabilities, Short-term funding, Long-term liabilities, Equity and Net interest expense ratio. 
Liabilities is log of total liabilities over GDP deflator. Deposits is log of deposits over GDP deflator. Non-deposit liabilities is log of non-deposit liabilities over 
GDP deflator. Short-term funding is log of short-term funding including deposits over GDP deflator. Long-term liabilities is log of total liabilities minus short-
term funding over GDP deflator. Equity is log of equity over GDP deflator.  Net interest expense ratio is log of interest expenses over total interest-bearing 
liabilities minus government T-Bill rate. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank 
is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans 
over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits  over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and 
mortgage bank and saving bank  are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). The p-
values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Liabilities Deposit Non-deposit liabilities Short-term funding Long-term liabilities Equity Net interest expense ratio 
Lagged dependent variable 0.993*** 1.000*** 0.977*** 0.985*** 0.967*** 0.984*** 0.991*** 0.995*** 0.960*** 0.969*** 0.995*** 1.001*** 0.426*** 0.404*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.148) (0.052) 
State bank 0.041** 0.043** 0.056*** 0.052** 0.090** 0.081** 0.044** 0.043** 0.093** 0.087** 0.026 0.028 0.013* 0.009 
(0.023) (0.033) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.030) (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.033) (0.139) (0.114) (0.056) (0.136) 
GDP per capita growth * State  bank -0.007** -0.008** -0.006 -0.005 -0.018** -0.020*** -0.006 -0.006* -0.011 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000  
(0.039) (0.020) (0.120) (0.166) (0.018) (0.006) (0.146) (0.099) (0.190) (0.115) (0.336) (0.359) (0.932) -0.000 
Government effectiveness 0.002 -0.015 -0.071* -0.088** 0.080 0.072 -0.022 -0.050 0.140* 0.106 -0.024 -0.022 -0.000 (0.597) 
(0.953) (0.589) (0.088) (0.017) (0.264) (0.312) (0.601) (0.215) (0.076) (0.182) (0.537) (0.560) (0.869)  
GDP per capita growth * State bank 
* Government effectiveness 
-0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.020*** -0.014* 0.001 -0.000 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007** -0.008** -0.001 -0.000 
(0.178) (0.181) (0.158) (0.439) (0.005) (0.053) (0.870) (0.946) (0.132) (0.399) (0.030) (0.027) (0.825) (0.981) 
Assets -0.005 -0.008 0.015 -0.000 0.044** 0.043** -0.002 -0.006 0.047** 0.046** -0.007 -0.016* 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.506) (0.261) (0.249) (0.974) (0.023) (0.024) (0.816) (0.410) (0.030) (0.034) (0.407) (0.057) (0.003) (0.233) 
Equity over assets 0.198* 0.318** 0.238 0.191 0.294* 0.739*** 0.254** 0.340** 0.176 0.327* -0.374*** -0.647*** -0.009 -0.031** 
(0.073) (0.011) (0.128) (0.220) (0.057) (0.000) (0.042) (0.010) (0.222) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.312) (0.021) 














































































































































































GDP per capita -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.006* -0.005 -0.000 0.001 -0.010*** -0.008** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000  
(0.320) (0.800) (0.533) (0.174) (0.064) (0.127) (0.920) (0.564) (0.006) (0.036) (0.646) (0.810) (0.548)  
Inflation -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 0.003 0.003 -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.005* 0.005* -0.003* -0.003** -0.001*** 0.404*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.324) (0.250) (0.001) (0.000) (0.098) (0.062) (0.065) (0.046) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.270*** -0.008 0.204** 0.460*** -0.345** -1.223*** 0.226*** 0.160 -0.258 -0.720*** 0.375*** 0.424*** -0.033*** -0.003 
(0.000) (0.934) (0.035) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.005) (0.107) (0.148) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.835) 
Number of observations 5298 5140 5154 5122 5170 5128 5228 5133 5244 5136 5292 5134 3555 3442 
Number of banks 1528 1486 1491 1481 1496 1483 1508 1482 1511 1484 1527 1485 1076 1045 
Number of instruments 352 358 352 358 352 358 352 358 352 358 352 358 337 343 
Second order AR tests 0.425 0.803 0.210 0.337 0.575 0.607 0.380 0.486 0.248 0.229 0.045 0.099 0.659 0.183 
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.631 0.562 0.749 0.818 0.820 0.738 0.674 0.447 0.949 0.978 0.435 0.587 0.244 0.413 





Table 4. The determinants of non-performing loans and loan loss provisioning 
 
The dependent variables are non-performing loans , which is log of non-performing loans over gross loans plus one, 
in regressions 1-4 and Loans loss provisioning, which is log of loan loss provisions over net loan ratio plus one, in 
regressions 5-8. GDP per capita growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity 
over total assets. Loans over assets is the net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. 
Deposits over liabilities is total deposits  over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank  and 
saving bank  are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of 
constant 2000 US dollars. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step 
system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). The p-values for robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Non-performing loans Loan loss provisioning 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.725*** 0.744*** 0.764*** 0.793*** 0.096 0.085 0.076 0.056 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.275) (0.326) (0.306) (0.452) 
GDP per capita growth -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State bank 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.773) (0.891) (0.427) (0.361) (0.933) (0.982) (0.297) (0.389) 
GDP per capita growth * 
State bank 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
(0.054) (0.060) (0.045) (0.032) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) 
Government 








GDP per capita growth * 










Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.149) (0.256) (0.742) (0.655) (0.221) (0.284) (0.961) (0.979) 
Equity over assets 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.005 
(0.905) (0.968) (0.407) (0.903) (0.626) (0.850) (0.728) (0.701) 






































































































GDP per capita -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.499) (0.583) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.693) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
(0.510) (0.557) (0.597) (0.711) (0.005) (0.021) (0.948) (0.814) 
Constant 0.048*** 0.042** 0.033** 0.024 0.096 0.085 0.027*** 0.027** 
(0.003) (0.040) (0.040) (0.139) (0.275) (0.326) (0.010) (0.024) 
31 
 
Number of observations  3991 3941 3503 3453 5855 5773 4965 4891 
Number of banks 1174 1162 1104 1092 1560 1541 1442 1425 
Number of instruments 270 276 347 352 272 278 350 355 
Second order AR tests 0.588 0.602 0.905 0.903 0.603 0.600 0.287 0.301 
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.112 0.166 0.658 0.701 0.090 0.104 0.056 0.175 
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Table 5. The determinants of bank loans including foreign bank ownership  
 
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of 
real per capita GDP growth. State bank, Domestic bank and Foreign bank are dummy variables that equals 1 if a 
bank is state-owned, domestically and privately owned or foreign-owned and privately owned with a majority share. 
Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over 
assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total 
deposits over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and mortgage bank  and saving bank  are dummies 
equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM estimation 
with Windmeijer correction (2005). The p-values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loans Loans Loans Loans 
Lagged loans 0.998*** 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.995*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 0.013*** 0.014***   
(0.000) (0.000)   
State bank 0.041* 0.044** 0.869*** 0.357 
(0.055) (0.031) (0.000) (0.270) 
Domestic bank  0.816*** 0.309 
(0.001) (0.332) 
Foreign bank  -0.035** -0.039*** 0.767*** 0.266 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.001) (0.404) 
GDP per capita growth * State bank -0.008** -0.008** 0.005* 0.006** 
(0.039) (0.016) (0.092) (0.031) 
GDP per capita growth * Domestic bank 0.011*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth * Foreign bank 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Assets -0.005 -0.002 -0.024* -0.005 
 
(0.606) (0.778) (0.057) (0.691) 
Equity over assets 0.067 0.033 -0.207 -0.003 
 
(0.343) (0.680) (0.107) (0.986) 
Loans over assets -0.076**  -0.080* 
 
(0.012)  (0.068) 
Liquidity 0.043  0.031 
 
(0.244)  (0.559) 
Deposits over liabilities 0.048**  0.034 
(0.032)  (0.361) 
Cooperative bank 0.033**  0.031** 
(0.022)  (0.028) 
Real estate and mortgage bank 0.011  0.009 
(0.471)  (0.565) 
Savings bank 0.019  0.017 
(0.162)  (0.203) 
GDP per capita -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.006) 
Inflation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 6181 6081 6181 6081 
Number of banks 1633 1609 1633 1609 
Number of instruments 401 407 455 461 
Second order AR tests 0.490 0.611 0.513 0.618 




Table 6. Bank loans in high income countries and developing countries  
 
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of 
real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority 
share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Assets is the natural logarithm 
of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is the 
share of net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total 
deposits  over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate & mortgage bank  and saving bank  are dummies 
equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. 
Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. Regressions 1-4  are for sample of high income countries, and 
regressions 5-8 are for developing and emerging countries. We estimate all regressions using two-step system GMM 
estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). The p-values for robust standard errors are given in parentheses.*, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
High income countries Developing and emerging markets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans 
Lagged loans 1.002*** 0.991*** 0.988*** 0.982*** 0.993*** 0.994*** 0.995*** 0.997*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 0.013*** 0.013** 0.008* 0.009* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.069) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth * 
State bank -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.015 -0.018 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.128) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) 
State bank 0.048** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.056** 0.052* 0.059*** 0.065*** 
(0.036) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.041) (0.056) (0.007) (0.005) 
Government effectiveness -0.040 -0.041 -0.020 0.004 
(0.109) (0.131) (0.547) (0.916) 
GDP per capita growth * 
State bank * Government 
effectiveness 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.946) (0.680) (0.245) (0.457) 
Assets -0.006 0.008 0.008 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 
(0.673) (0.668) (0.433) (0.188) (0.923) (0.908) (0.477) (0.342) 
Equity over assets -0.007 -0.014 -0.093 -0.091 0.168 0.166 0.031 0.072 
(0.930) (0.860) (0.252) (0.284) (0.127) (0.273) (0.736) (0.572) 
Loans over assets 0.004 0.001 -0.175*** -0.138*** 
(0.956) (0.987) (0.000) (0.008) 
Liquidity 0.032 0.020 0.056 0.074 
(0.465) (0.680) (0.292) (0.185) 
Deposits over liabilities 0.055* 0.042 0.026 0.024 
(0.076) (0.173) (0.505) (0.501) 
Cooperative bank 0.030** 0.027** 0.103*** 0.105** 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.002) (0.011) 
Real estate and mortgage 
bank 0.008 0.021 0.000 -0.006 
(0.696) (0.415) (0.994) (0.819) 
Savings bank 0.014 -0.001 0.022 0.020 
(0.366) (0.923) (0.523) (0.631) 
GDP per capita -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.006*** -0.005* -0.001 -0.003 
(0.016) (0.136) (0.723) (0.937) (0.009) (0.052) (0.795) (0.527) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
(0.775) (0.625) (0.984) (0.972) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.157** 0.025 0.156** 0.062 0.232*** 0.248** 0.273*** 0.311** 
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(0.028) (0.861) (0.040) (0.655) (0.006) (0.020) (0.005) (0.011) 
Number of observations 3439 3374 2889 2831 2742 2707 2329 2301 
Number of banks 976 957 886 868 657 652 620 615 
Number of instruments 221 227 271 277 269 275 344 350 
Second order AR tests 0.994 0.997 0.365 0.341 0.314 0.397 0.464 0.534 




Table 7. Bank lending during banking crises  
 
The dependent variable is Loans, which is log of net loans over GDP deflator. GDP per capita growth is the rate of 
real per capita GDP growth. State bank is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is state-owned with a majority 
share. Government effectiveness is an index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Banking crisis is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the country is in a banking crisis. Assets is log of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. 
Equity over assets is equity over total assets. Loans over assets is net loans over total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets 
over total assets. Deposits over liabilities is total deposits  over total liabilities. Cooperative bank, real estate and 
mortgage bank  and saving bank  are dummies equaling 1 if a bank is that type. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in 
thousands of constant 2000 US dollars. Inflation is the rate of change in GDP deflator. We estimate all regressions 
using two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction (2005). The p-values for robust standard errors 
are given in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lagged loans 1.005*** 1.000*** 0.996*** 0.994*** 1.003*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.993*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State bank 0.042 0.047* 0.042 0.051* -0.038 -0.028 -0.022 -0.021 
 
(0.108) (0.057) (0.112) (0.053) (0.457) (0.586) (0.621) (0.650) 
GDP per capita growth * 
State bank 
-0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) 










GDP per capita growth * 




    
   
(0.088) (0.123) 
    
Banking crisis -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.020* 
 
(0.695) (0.526) (0.269) (0.185) (0.292) (0.169) (0.148) (0.065) 
Banking crisis * State bank 0.020 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.123* 0.129* 
 
(0.626) (0.717) (0.518) (0.717) (0.004) (0.007) (0.080) (0.079) 
Banking crisis * State bank 
* Government 
effectiveness 
      
0.006 -0.001 
       
(0.891) (0.980) 
Assets -0.011 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.003 0.001 
 
(0.287) (0.498) (0.716) (0.936) (0.612) (0.996) (0.742) (0.896) 
Equity 0.085 0.048 -0.003 0.019 0.076 0.047 0.009 0.001 
 
(0.231) (0.537) (0.969) (0.808) (0.336) (0.553) (0.896) (0.986) 






































































































GDP per capita -0.001** -0.001* 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.031) (0.082) (0.405) (0.479) (0.097) (0.111) (0.617) (0.829) 
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Inflation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.174*** 0.157** 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.147** 0.122* 0.173*** 0.178** 
 
(0.004) (0.024) (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.097) (0.004) (0.016) 
Number of observations 6181 6081 5218 5132 6181 6081 5218 5132 
Number of banks 1633 1609 1506 1483 1633 1609 1506 1483 
Number of instruments 299 305 376 382 234 240 277 283 
Second order AR tests 0.509 0.620 0.908 0.832 0.543 0.674 0.880 0.778 
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.584 0.631 0.952 0.973 0.148 0.137 0.302 0.294 
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Figure 1. Average share of assets owned by state-owned banks  
 
The figure show the yearly average share of bank assets owned by state-owned banks, computed as a weighted 
average of individual country shares with the weights reflecting the number of observations in individual countries 
over the 1999-2010 period. The three lines present all countries, high income countries, and developing countries 
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